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Section 1972: Augmenting the Available Remedies for
Plaintiffs Injured by Anticompetitive Bank Conduct
With the passage of section 106(b) of the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, codified at 12 U.S.C. section 1972,1
Congress created a special cause of action 2 which allows private
plaintiffs to recover damages against banks and bank holding companies that participate in anticompetitive tying arrangements 3 and
reciprocal 4 and exclusive dealing arrangements. 5 Essentially, the
purpose of section 1972 is to "prohibit anti-competitive practices
which require bank customers to accept or provide some other ser1

12 U.S.C. § 1972 (1982). This provision provides:

(1) A bank shall not in any manner extend credit, lease or sell property of any
kind, or furnish any service, or fix or vary the consideration for any of the foregoing, on the condition or requirement-(a) that the customer shall obtain some
additional credit, property, or service from such bank other than a loan, discount,
deposit, or trust service; (b) that the customer shall obtain some additional credit,
property, or service from a bank holding company of such bank, or from any other
subsidiary of such bank holding company; (c) that the customer provide some additional credit, property, or service to such bank, other than those related to and
usually provided in connection with a loan, discount, deposit, or trust service; (d)
that the customer provide some additional credit, property, or service to a bank
holding company of such bank, or to any other subsidiary of such bank holding
company; or (e) that the customer shall not obtain some other credit, property, or
service from a competitor of such bank, a bank holding company of such bank, or
any subsidiary of such bank holding company, other than a condition or requirement that such bank shall reasonably impose in a credit transaction to assure the
soundness of the credit.
The board may by regulation or order permit such exceptions to the foregoing
prohibition as it considers will not be contrary to the purposes of this chapter.
The Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 proscribes tying arrangements and reciprocal and exclusive dealing arrangements involving federally chartered savings and loan associations and federally chartered banks. Section 331, 12 U.S.C. § 1464(q)
(1982), mirrors the language of § 1972. Because of the similarity in language, courts interpreting § 1464(q) will probably follow the case law which interprets § 1972. In addition,
Congress seems to have intended that § 1464(q) have the same effect as § 1972. See S. REP.
No. 536, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 55, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3054,
3109.
2 Section 106(e) of the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1975 (1982), provides for the recovery of treble damages and attorney's fees against violators of § 1972. The provision states:
Any person who is injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in section 1972 of this title may sue therefore in any district court of the
United States in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without
regard to the amount in controversy, and shall be entitled to recover three times
the amount of the damages sustained by him, and the cost of suit, including a
reasonable attorney's fee.
12 U.S.C. § 1975 (1982).
3 See note 12 infra and accompanying text.
4 See notes 13-15 infra and accompanying text.
5 See note 16 infra and accompanying text.
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vice or product or refrain from dealing with other parties in order
to obtain the bank product or service they desire." 6 Congress enacted section 1972 partly in response to a perceived breakdown in
the traditional separation of the banking industry from other areas
of commerce in the economy. 7 Arguably, the unchecked participation of banks and bank holding companies in other areas of business could "lead to the formation of a relatively small number of
power centers dominating the American economy." 8 By proscribing anticompetitive tying arrangements and similar conditional
transactions imposed by banks and bank holding companies, Congress intended to check the growth of economic power of the
money lenders, the financial institutions, in relation to the borrowers, businesses and ordinary consumers. 9 Some commentators believe that section 1972 will gain in importance as the financial
industry becomes increasingly deregulated.' 0
This note first examines the policies underlying section 1972
and why the provision assists the private plaintiff in combating tying
arrangements and reciprocal and exclusive dealing arrangements
imposed by banks and bank holding companies. Next, this note
discusses how courts have interpreted section 1972, focusing on
who can be a party to a section 1972 action, what conduct falls
within its prohibitions, and finally, what conduct falls outside section 1972 as being "traditional banking practices." This note concludes that two policy considerations should guide courts in
interpreting section 1972: promoting competition in the economy
and protecting banks' legitimate business interests in the extension
of credit.
I.

Policies Underlying Section 1972

Evaluating the policy concerns underlying laws making certain
conditional transactions illegal is helpful to an understanding of
how courts should interpret section 1972. Both section 1972 and
the general antitrust laws, such as section .one of the Sherman
Act," condemn tying arrangements, reciprocal dealing and exclu6

See S. REP. No. 1084, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &

AD. NEWS, 5519, 5535.
7
8
9

Id. at 44, 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 5557.
Id., 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 5557.
Id., 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 5557.

10 See, e.g., Leonard, Unfair Competition Under Section 106 of the Bank Holding Company Act:
An Economic and Legal Overview of "Conditional Transactions," 94 BANKING LJ. 773 (1977).
11 Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982), proscribes tying arrangements
in a variety of industries and business:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in
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sive dealing arrangements. A tie-in or tying arrangement has been
defined by the courts as "an arrangement by one party to sell one
product (the 'tying product'), but only on the condition that the
buyer also purchase a different. . product (the 'tied product'), or
at least agree that he will not purchase that product from any other
supplier." 12 In general, reciprocal dealing arrangements involve
those practices in which firms buying raw materials favor those
firms which purchase their finished products. In the context of financial institutions, a bank may provide a product or service to a
customer, requiring that in return the customer provide a specified
product or service to the bank. 13 Voluntary reciprocal dealing arrangements are legal.1 4 But coercive reciprocity, where a firm
purchases products from a second firm conditioned upon the otherwise unwilling second firm buying products from it, falls within the
parameters of the antitrust laws.1 5 Finally, exclusive dealing arany combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty
of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding
one million dollars if a corporation, or if any other person, one hundred thousand
dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
Tie-ins can also be challenged under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15
U.S.C. § 45 (1982) and under § 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1982). Although
significant differences in the substance and application of these provisions exist, a discussion of them is beyond the scope of this note. Simply stated, however, commentators
would agree that a tying arrangement which violates § 1 of the Sherman Act also violates
§ 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. A tie-in violates § 3 of the Clayton Act when it
meets the tests for illegality under § I of the Sherman Act and also involves a sale or lease
of a commodity. See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 152, at 434
(1977). Because banking tying arrangements often involve an extension of credit, which is
a service, § 3 of the Clayton Act, which addresses only tie-ins involving commodities, cannot be used very often to attack tying arrangements imposed by banks. The discussion of
the general antitrust laws which follows in this note generally refers to violations of § I of
the Sherman Act which can also be violations of other antitrust laws. See notes 41-44 infra
and accompanying text.
12 See, e.g., Northern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958) (tying arrangement requiring grantees and lessees of railroad property forced to ship goods over the
railroad's lines held illegal under the Sherman Act).
13 Leonard, supra note 10, at 775.
14 Id. at 790.
15 Coercive reciprocity can be challenged under the Sherman, Federal Trade Commission, and Clayton Acts. See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36, 37
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) (holding that a merger which resulted in reciprocal trading violated § 1 of
the Sherman Act); 2 E. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 10.67 (1980).
As discussed later in this note, see notes 100-03 infra and accompanying text, § 1972
excludes from its coverage reciprocal dealing arrangements involving "traditional banking
practices." Although individual banks might engage in reciprocal dealing arrangements
prohibited by § 1972, their use of such illegal arrangements is restrained because the banking laws permit them to offer only a limited array of services. Thus, banks have fewer opportunities to take advantage of their economic position to impose illegal tying
arrangements. Because bank holding companies often engage in a variety of businesses
besides simply controlling a bank, the potential for bank holding companies to engage in
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rangements restrain a firm's customers from obtaining other similar
goods or services from competitors. 16 Such arrangements can also
17
violate section one of the Sherman Act.
Section 1972 specifically proscribes certain anticompetitive tying arrangements and other conditional transactions involving
banks and bank holding companies. As with the general antitrust
laws, Congress primarily sought to promote competition in the
economy.'8 In enacting section 1972, Congress was especially
mindful of the case law treating anticompetitive tying arrangements
under the general antitrust laws. 19 That case law identified three
adverse effects of anticompetitive tying arrangements. 20 First,
through such arrangements, a firm can injure its existing competitors. The provider of goods or services uses the economic advantage gained from the tying product to sell in the tied product
market. Without providing cheaper or better goods or services, the
firm can still capture part of the tied product market. The competitors of the seller in the tied product market are thus hampered in
making sales. 21 Second, through tying arrangements, a firm can deter potential competitors from entering the tying and tied product
markets. 22 To successfully compete with a firm which imposes tying
arrangements on its customers, a potential competitor may have to
enter both markets. Because of capital costs and risks of failure,
however, a competitor may find it quite difficult to enter both markets at the same time. 23 Finally, by employing tying arrangements,
proscribed reciprocal dealing arrangements is significantly greater. Typically, reciprocal
dealing arrangements arise whenever a customer must provide a product or service to a
bank or bank holding company in exchange for financial or other services. For example, a
bank would be engaging in a reciprocal dealing arrangement if it awarded branch-office
construction business to a firm on the condition that the firm maintain a certain balance
with the bank. See Leonard, supra note 10, at 792.
16 See E. KiNTNER, supra note 15, § 10.75.
17 Bales v. Kansas City Star Co., 336 F.2d 439 (8th Cir. 1964) (newspaper distributor
who was allowed to distribute only the defendant's newspaper stated a claim under the
Sherman Act).
18 S. REP. No. 1084, supra note 6, at 44, reprintedin 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws,
at 5557.
19 lI at 45, 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, at 5558.
20 See Bauer, A Simplified Approach to Tying Arrangements: A Legal and EconomicAnalysis, 33
VAND. L. REv. 283, 287 (1980).
21 IBM v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936), exemplifies this type of conduct. In that
case, the defendant agreed to lease its tabulating and sorting machines condition that the
lessee agree to buy its tabulating cards. The court held that this arrangement violated § 3
of the Clayton Act.
22 Bauer, supra note 20, at 288.
23 United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922), illustrates this anticompetitive conduct. The defendant in that case controlled 957o of the shoe machinery
market. Because it imposed a tying arrangement requiring its customers to purchase its
supplies, the defendant prevented potential competitors from reaching 95%o of the supplies
market.
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a firm can force customers to purchase goods or services which they
24
either do not want or would purchase from another firm.
As the banking industry becomes increasingly deregulated, 2 5
banks and bank holding companies will have more opportunities to
impose anticompetitive tying arrangements. For example, during
the 1970's the Federal Reserve Board allowed bank holding compa26
nies to compete in the insurance and data processing industries.
Trade associations in these industries alleged that bank holding
companies competed unfairly in these industries because they
could enforce credit tie-ins. 27 A bank holding company could require a businessman to purchase insurance from one of its affiliates
before obtaining credit from a bank under its control. Under the
Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982,28 Congress
curtailed the types of insurance activities in which bank holding
companies could participate. Despite this setback, bankers favoring
deregulation have continued their efforts to persuade Congress to
permit banks and bank holding companies to engage in activities
such as insurance underwriting, real estate investment, and securities underwriting. 29 Some commentators suggest that banking deregulation is inevitable. 30 Bank and bank holding company
deregulation will greatly enhance the significance of section 1972.
Historically, Congress has attempted to separate the business
of banking and other forms of commerce.3 1 Congress' rationale
stems from two policy considerations: (1) maintaining bank solvency, and (2) promoting competition in the economy. 32 During
the hearings on the Bank Holding Company Act of 1970, Richard
W. McLaren, then Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, suggested that allowing banks to compete in other areas of commerce
poses "risks to our competitive system." 33 McLaren argued that
banks enjoy a significant degree of economic power which stems
24 Bauer, supra note 20, at 288. Some economists, however, argue that many tying arrangements do not always harm competition and that, therefore, the per se rule against
them is inappropriate. Id. at 291. Recent.cases have addressed this. See Jefferson Parish
Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1574 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
25 See note 30 infra and accompanying text.
26 Wilson, Separation of Banking and Commerce Under the Bank Holding Company Act-A Statutory Objective Under Attack, 33 CATH. U.L. REV. 163, 167 (1983).
27 Leonard, supra note 10, at 778.
28 12 U.S.C. § 1843(4)(c)(8) (1982).
29 Wilson, supra note 26, at 164.
30 See, e.g., Shull, The Separation of Banking and Commerce: Origin, Development, and Implicationsfor Antitrust, 28 ANTITRUST BULL. 255, 256 (1983).
31 Id. at 270. See also Wilson, supra note 26, at 163.
32 Shull, supra note 30, at 270.
33 One-Bank Holding Company Legislation of 1970: Hearings on S. 1052, S. 1211, S. 1664, 5.
3823, and H.R. 6778 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 239
(1970) (statement of Richard W. McLaren, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division,
U.S. Dep't ofJustice).
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from the protection of banks through "regulation from free entry
of other competitors, and therefore from the full rigors of unregulated competition." 3 4 Congress' protection of banks from competition reflects its concern for bank solvency. McLaren argued that
"bank expansion in other areas permits the carryover of economic
power into such endeavors." 35 If banks are allowed to compete in
other areas of commerce, McLaren continues, "there is.

.

.the ob-

vious danger of overt reciprocity or tying arrangements, as well as
general favoritism of bank affiliates, particularly in times of tight
money." 3 6 McLaren believed that the antitrust laws would not adequately prevent reduced competition in the various areas of com37
merce which, because of deregulation, banks might enter.
Congress enacted section 1972 in part because of concern
about the adverse effects of banking deregulation on competition in
the economy. The Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of
1970 permits bank holding companies to engage in activities
"closely related" to banking.38 This standard allowed bank holding
companies to engage in a broad range of insurance activities
throughout the 1970's until Congress passed the Garn-St. Germain
Act in 1982 a 9 which modified it. Congress may have intended to
compensate for the anticompetitive consequences of deregulation
by coupling section 1972 with the rest of the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments.
Presumably, Congress felt that the competitive environment
40
surrounding financial institutions deserved special protection.
Section 1972 makes it easier for private plaintiffs to establish a
cause of action and recover damages for anticompetitive conditional transactions than the general antitrust laws. Comparing section 1972 to the general antitrust laws demonstrates how this
provision better implements congressional antitrust policies as applied to banks and bank holding companies.
The Sherman Act 4 ' and the general antitrust laws treat conditional transactions involving financial institutions like conditional
transactions involving other industries. To establish a prima facie
case for an illegal tying arrangement under the general antitrust
laws a plaintiff must prove three elements. First, the plaintiff must
show that two separate products are involved, with the purchase of
34

Id.

35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 240.
38 12 U.S.C. § 1843(4)(c)(8) (1982).
39 Id. See also note 28 supra and accompanying text.
40 See S. REP. No. 1084, supra note 6, at 17, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS, at 5535.
41 See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
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one, the tying product, conditioned upon the purchase of another
less desirable product, the tied product. 4 2 Second, the plaintiff
must demonstrate that the defendant, the party imposing the tying
arrangement, has sufficient economic power with respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain free competition in the market
for the tied product. 43 Hence, the plaintiff must prove the existence of the type of leverage or economic power which allows the
defendant to raise prices or requires the purchaser to accept burdensome terms not ordinarily found in a completely competitive
market. Third, the plaintiff must show that the tying arrangement
44
substantially affects interstate commerce.
Courts use this three step analysis to determine whether a tying
arrangement is "per se" unlawful. 45 The "sufficient market power"
requirement has caused courts the greatest difficulty. Two United
States Supreme Court decisions illustrate this problem. In Fortner
Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp. ("Fortner I"),46 United
States Steel, through one of its subsidiaries, offered attractive credit
services to developers who agreed to purchase prefabricated
houses through another subsidiary. 4 7 In FortnerI, the Court stated:
The standard of "sufficient economic power" does not, as
the District Court held, require that the defendant have a monopoly or even a dominant position throughout the market for
the tying product. Our tie-in cases have made unmistakably
clear that the economic power over the tying product can be
sufficient even though the power falls far short of dominance
and even though the power exists only with respect to some of
the buyers in the market.... Even absent a showing of market
dominance, the crucial economic power may be inferred from
the tying product's desirability
to consumers or from unique48
ness in its attributes.
In contrast to the Supreme Court's subsequent decisions, 49
Fortner I allowed plaintiffs to show "market power" with relative
ease. 50 FortnerI also rejected the argument that tying arrangements
involving credit should receive different treatment than tying ar42 See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
43 See notes 45-60 infra and accompanying text.
44 This condition has been relatively easy to meet. In Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United
States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1969), the Supreme Court found that a not insubstantial amount of interstate commerce was affected by a tying arrangement in which the
value of the tied product actually purchased by the plaintiff was only $190,000.
45 Northern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958) (Court applied this three
step analysis in a Sherman § 1 case).
46 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
47 Id. at 497.
48 Id. at 502-03 (citations omitted).
49 See notes 57-62 infra and accompanying text.
50 394 U.S. at 508.
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rangements involving other products. 5 ' The Supreme Court stated
that "although advantageous credit terms may be viewed as a form
of price competition in the tied product, so is the offer of any other
tying product on advantageous terms."' 52 While the Supreme
Court remanded the case for further findings on whether an illegal
tying arrangement existed, FortnerI established the rule that using
credit to impose a tying arrangement can be illegal under the antitrust laws. 53 In examining the tie-ins involving credit, the Court

stated:
[T]he same inquiries must be made as to economic power over
the tying product and substantial effect in the tied market, but
where these factors are present no special treatment can bejusis
tified solely because credit, rather than some other product, 54
the source of the tying leverage used to restrain competition.
Congress apparently considered the FortnerI decision in passing section 1972. Congress wanted to create a cause of action
"substantially easier to establish than the one provided under the
general antitrust laws" to combat anticompetitive tying arrangements involving banks. In a Senate report accompanying section
1972, Senator Edward Brooke, quoting from a letter from then Assistant Attorney General McLaren, wrote that "the proposed new
section would go beyond the Fortner decision, which did not go so
far as to hold tie-ins involving credit illegal per se."' 5 5 The provision "would prevent the further spread of seriously anticompetitive
practices which have developed in the banking and financial
areas."

56

The Supreme Court's decision in United States Steel Corporationv.
Fortner Enterprises ("Fortner II"),57 significantly enhanced section

1972's importance. In Fortner II, the Court expanded the requirements for establishing the tier's economic power.58 The FortnerII
51 Id.
52 Id. at 509.
53 Id.. See also Klebaner, Credit Tie-ins: Where Banks Stand After the Former Decision, 95
BANKING L.J. 419 (1978); Naegele, The Anti-tying Provision: Its Potential Is Still There, 100
BANKING LJ. 138, 143 (1983).
54 394 U.S. at 509.
55 S. REP. No. 1084, supra note 6, at 45, reprintedin 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
at 5558.
56 Id., 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5558.
57 429 U.S. 610 (1977).
58 Id. at 417-22. In FortnerI, 394 U.S. 495, the Supreme Court held that a showing of a
unique economic advantage in the tying market satisfies the economic power requirement.
Under Fortner II, the court must examine whether the seller in the tying market has the
ability to either charge a price or impose a burden that he would be able to extract in a
competitive market. 429 U.S. at 620. Without demonstrating either some cost advantage
on the part of the seller or a characteristic of the tying item that sufficiently differentiates
the product so that no competitor could also offer it, the economic power requirement is
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Court's analysis of the supposed tying arrangement perhaps indicates that allegedly unlawful tying arrangements are subject to
greater "scrutiny to determine whether they truly represent the exploitation of a position of economic power in the tying product." 59
The FortnerII decision made it more difficult than FortnerI for plaintiffs to show market power in establishing a Sherman Act violation. 60 In a recent case, Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v.
Hyde, 6 ' the Supreme Court again expanded the requirements for
establishing the tier's economic power. The Court now seems to
require plaintiffs to show market power through a detailed eco62
nomic analysis of the relevant product and geographical markets.
In contrast to section one of the Sherman Act, section 1972
does not require proof that the tie affects a "not insubstantial"
amount of interstate commerce in the tied product market and that
the defendant possesses the requisite economic power in the tying
product market. 6 3 While it may be relatively easy to establish that a
tying arrangement affects a "not insubstantial amount of commerce" under the general antitrust laws, 64 it may not be so easy to
establish that the tier possesses the requisite economic power to
show an unlawful tying arrangement. In fashioning section 1972,
Congress recognized that proving an antitrust violation involving a
financial institution could be difficult because few plaintiffs could
65
adduce sufficient evidence of the institution's market power.
not met. Id. The mere fact that the tying product is attractive does not establish sufficient
economic power. Id. at 621. See also E. KINTNER, supra note 15, § 10.56.
59 Jones, The Two Faces of Fortner: Comment On a Recent Antitrust Opinion, 78 COLUM. L.
REV. 39, 41 (1978).
60 E. KINTNER, supra note 15, § 10.56.

61 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984) (an allegedly anticompetitive tying arrangement between a
hospital and a firm of anesthesiologists did not violate the Sherman Act).
62 Id. at 1561.
63 See, e.g., Costner v. Blount Nat'l Bank, 578 F.2d 1192, 1196 (6th Cir. 1978). The
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit stated that even when evidence of market power of
the defendant and the effect on interstate commerce of a tying arrangement are insufficient
to make out a cause of action under § 1 of the Sherman Act, a plaintiff can still prevail
under § 1972. Costner involved a tying arrangement which was created when the plaintiff,
owner of 50%o of the stock in an automobile dealership, obtained a $420,000 personal loan
from the defendant bank to buy the remaining stock in the company.
64 See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
65

S. REP. No. 1084, supra note 6, at 48, reprintedin 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS,

at 5561; Naegele, supra note 53, at 143. While Congress intended that § 1972 would make
it easier to bring an action against a bank or bank holding company, Congress also sought
to prevent overly broad judicial interpretations of § 1972. For this reason, Congress allows
the Federal Reserve Board to issue regulations permitting exceptions to the prohibitions of
§ 1972. Section 1972 states that the "Board may by regulation or order permit such exceptions to the foregoing prohibition as it considers will not be contrary to the purposes of this
chapter." The Board's exceptions apply only to § 1972 and do not extend to actions
brought under the general antitrust laws. Secton 106(h) of the Bank Holding Company Act
Amendments of 1970, 12 U.S.C. § 1978 provides:
Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed as affecting in any manner
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Moreover, in enacting section 1972, Congress recognized that
tying arrangements by financial institutions generally do not involve the large dollar amounts that justify expensive and time-consuming antitrust litigation. In a letter to Senator Edward Brooke,
Assistant Attorney General McLaren noted that the limited scope
and small monetary amounts involved in bank tying cases did not
justify full scale antitrust investigation and trial because the complex legal issues involved could result in decisions of little precedential value. 66 Arguably, by providing treble damage relief to
private plaintiffs, Congress sought to encourage the private enforcement of section 1972.
II. Judicial Interpretation of Section 1972
Case law interpreting section 1972 is sparse. 67 The reported
decisions, however, focus primarly on three aspects of section
1972: (1) who can bring an action under the statute; (2) what kinds
of conduct violate the provision; and (3) what kinds of conduct fall
within the exceptions to section 1972.68
the right of the United States or any other party to bring an action under any other
law of the United States or of any State, including any right which may exist in
addition to specific statutory authority, challenging the legality of any act or practice which may be proscribed by this chapter. No regulation or order issued by the
Board under this chapter shall in any manner constitute a defense to such action.
12 U.S.C. § 1978 (1982).
The United States Attorney General also has the responsibility of policing violations of
§ 1972. However, as one commentator notes, a review of the relevant case law reveals no
recorded decisions in which the government has brought an action under this provision.
See Neagele, supra note 53; at 144.
Section 106(c) of the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1973, establishes the duty of the Attorney General to enforce § 1972:
The district courts of the United States have jurisdiction to prevent and restrain
violations of section 1972 of this title and it is the duty of the United States attorneys, under the direction of the Attorney General, to institute proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain such violations. The proceedings may be by way of a
petition setting forth the case and praying that the violation be enjoined or otherwise prohibited. When the parties complained of have been duly notified of the
petition, the court shall proceed, as soon as possible, to the hearing and determination of the case. While the petition is pending, and before final decree, the
court may at any time make such temporary restraining order or prohibition as it
deems just. Whenever it appears to the court that the ends ofjustice require that
other parties be brought before it, the court may cause them to be summoned
whether or not they reside in the district in which the court is held, and subpeonas
to that end may be served in in any district by the marshal thereof.
12 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982).
66 S. REP. No. 1084, supra note 6, at 47, reprintedin 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS,
at 5561.
67 A search of all reported cases up to 1983 reveals not more than 20 decisions. See
Naegele, supra note 53, at 144.
68 Other commentators have analyzed case law interpreting section 1972 in the same
way. See Naegele, supra note 53, at 144.
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Who Can Bring an Action under Section 1972

Under section 1975,69 which establishes the standing requirements for section 1972, a plaintiff bringing a treble damage suit
must allege an injury to his business or property. 7 0 Although the
requirement seems plain on its face, some commentators believe
that courts may read additional standing requirements into the statute. 7 1 In interpreting other antitrust provisions containing virtually
the same language as section 1975, courts have held that only those
plaintiffs whose injuries are a direct result of the prohibited activity
have standing to sue for treble damages. 72 Indeed, one commentator has suggested that one such provision, section four of the Clayton Act, 73 has been "narrowed through standing requirements
invented and elaborated upon by the courts." 74 Under section
four, the plaintiff must show not only that the defendant's anticompetitive conduct was the cause in fact of the plaintiff's injury, but
also that the defendant's conduct was the proximate cause of the
injury. 75 Arguably, the courts may read similar requirements into
section 1972.
This type of judicial gloss on section 1975's standing require69 12 U.S.C. § 1975 (1982).
70 In Hometowne Builders, Inc. v. Atlantic Nat'l Bank, 477 F. Supp. 717, 719 (E.D. Va.
1979), the plaintiffs, in an action brought under § 1972, claimed they were entitled to punitive damages in excess of the treble damages granted by § 1975. The court stated that the
absence of any discussion of punitive damages in excess of treble damages in the legislative
history of § 1972 "is a strong indication that such damages were not contemplated by Congress and were not implied in the statute."
71 See, e.g., Naegele, supra note 53, at 145.
72 See, e.g., Productive Inventions, Inc. v. Trice Prod. Corp., 224 F.2d 678, 679 (2d Cir.
1955) (in an action under § 4 of the Clayton Act, the Second Circuit stated, "those harmed
only incidentally by anti-trust violations have no standing to sue for treble damages; only
those at whom the violation is directly aimed, or who have been directly harmed may
recover").
73 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982). The statute states:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the
United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an
agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold
the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
Id.
74

L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 247, at 270 (1977). Under § 4,

a competitor driven out of business by a defendant's anticompetitive tactics clearly would
have standing. However, the injured competitor's suppliers, landlord, employees, and
stockholders, regardless of the extent of the injury, may have no standing unless, under the
particular circumstances, they could demonstrate a more immediate relation to the violation than that which is typically associated with their status. Id.
75 See, e.g., Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 327 F.2d 725, 732 (8th Cir.
1964) (stating that damages claimed in a private antitrust suit must be different from those
suffered by the general public).
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ment runs counter to congressional intent. 76 Congress intended to
encourage private plaintiffs to sue for section 1972 violations. 77
The provision was intended to supplement existing remedies for
anticompetitive tying arrangements. 78 The legislative history does
not mention any standing requirements other than those expressly
stated in the statute. Nor does the legislative history indicate that
Congress intended courts to interpret section 1972 in the same way
in which similarly worded statutes are interpreted. While Congress
may have known of the judicial gloss placed on other provisions
worded similarly to section 1975, it clearly intended to create a
cause of action which was easier to bring than actions under the
general antitrust laws and thus free of their restrictive
interpretations.
Two cases, Swerdloff v. Miami National Bank79 and Shulman v.
Continental Bank, 80 illustrate how courts have handled the standing
issue.8 1 In Swerdloff, the defendant, Miami National Bank, loaned
money to a corporation wholly-owned by the plaintiffs. As a condition to the loans, the defendant bank required the Swerdloffs to
personally guarantee the loans. In their suit against Miami National
for violating section 1972, the Swerdloffs alleged that after their
company became heavily dependent on the financial arrangement,
76

Naegele, supra note 53, at 146.

77 S. REP. No. 1084, supra note 6, at 46, reprinted in 1970 U.S.

CODE CONG.

&

AD. NEws,

at 5559.

78 Id. at 18, 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, at 5536. The Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency stated that "private parties are given the right to sue for injunctive
relief as well as treble damages when they have sustained damages, or are threatened by
loss or damage, by reason of a violation of this section's prohibitions." Id.
79 584 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1978).
80 518 F. Supp. 979 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
81 Both Swerdloff and Shulman dealt with the question of who can be a plaintiff under
§ 1972. Few cases have treated the question of who can be a defendant. In general, only
banks and bank holding companies can be defendants. In McCoy v. Franklin Savings Ass'n,
636 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1980), an action was brought under § 1972 against a Chicago savings association. The question of the applicability of the provision was apparently not
raised. See Naegele, supra note 53, at 139 n.5. Congress has defined a bank holding company as "any company which has control over any bank." 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (1982).
Likewise, Congress has defined a bank as "any institution organized under the laws of the
United States, any State of the United States. . . which (1) accepts deposits that the depositor has a legal right to withdraw on demand, and (2) engages in the business of making
commercial loans." 12 U.S.C. § 841(c) (1982).
In Nesglo, Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 506 F. Supp. 254 (D.P.R. 1980), the court
held that the activities of natural persons are not covered by § 1972. The court stated:
With respect to the federal tie-in claims made against natural codefendants Zych
and Fernandez, it is obvious from the text of the statutory definition of the term
"bank" in 12 U.S.C. Section 1984(c), to which Section 1972 permits us, that natural persons are beyond coverage of 12 U.S.C. sections 1971-1978. We therefore
additionally hold that this Court lacks jurisdiction under these federal statutes to
entertain the foregoing claims against codefendants Zych and Fernandez.
Id. at 265.
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the bank would no longer continue the arrangement unless the
plaintiffs sold 51% of their stock to another one of Miami National's customers. The Swerdloffs refused, and consequently their
82
company was allegedly forced out of business.
In Swerdloff, the lower court analogized the provision to other
antitrust statutes, and case law interpreting those statutes, to determine whether the plaintiffs had standing to sue under section
1972.83 The district court held that although the Swerdloffs may
have personally suffered a financial injury, their corporation was the
only "person" that could seek redress for the alleged violation of
section 1972.84 The court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing
85
required by section 1975 and dismissed the suit.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal.8 6 The court of appeals held that the Swerdloffs were customers of the defendant
bank within the meaning of section 1972 because the Swerdloffs
had personally guaranteed Miami National's loans to their company.8 7 Miami National argued that because the Swerdloffs were
not actual parties to the bank's financing agreement with the Swerdloffs' corporation, the Swerdloffs were not customers.8 8 The court
rejected this argument noting, "the economic realities of ownership
and control must be considered in determining who is a customer
within the meaning of [section 1972] if the purpose of the Act is to
be accomplished." 8 9 The court indicated the policy concerns underlying its holding:
To decide in favor of the bank here would mean that banks
throughout the country could require all manner of anticompetitive practices of the stockholders of such corporations with impunity. The law cannot be unmindful of the fact that substantial
credit to such corporations is generally extended because of the
credit rating of the stockholder guarantors, regardless of the
credit-worthiness of the corporation itself. This credit practice
recognizes that the financial fortunes of closely held corporations can turn directly upon the maneuverings of the
stockholders. 90
The court did not reach the question of whether the Swerdloffs as
stockholders would still have standing under section 1975 had the
82
83
84

584 F.2d at 57.
408 F. Supp. 940, 942 (S.D. Fla. 1976).
Id. at 943.

85

Id.

86

Swerdloff v. Miami Nat'l Bank, 584 F.2d 54, 60 (5th Cir. 1978).

87
88

Id.
Id.

89

Id. at 58.

90 Id.
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court held that they were not customers within the meaning of the
statute. 9 '
In Shulman v. Continental Bank, 9 2 the plaintiffs' complaint alleged wrongs similar to those presented in Swerdloff. The
Shulmans, controlling shareholders, officers, and directors of Shulman Transport Enterprises, Inc., alleged that Continental Bank violated section 1972 by requiring them to provide $1.3 million in the
form of a junior participation in the bank's loan to Shulman Transport Enterprises before extending further credit to their company. 93 The Shulmans contended that based on Swerdloff they had
standing to bring the action.9 4 The district court, however, distinguished Swerdloff "because the Swerdloffs' company, which entered
into a loan agreement with the bank, was a closely held family corporation in which the Swerdloffs were the sole stockholders." 9 5
Shulman Transport Enterprises was a publicly held corporation
and, according to the court, no close legal identity existed between
96
the plaintiffs and the corporate borrower.
The legislative intent underlying section 1972 suggests, however, that no significant difference exists between the allegations in
Shulman and those in Swerdloff. By enacting section 1972, Congress
intended to impose a broad prohibition of conditional transactions
imposed by banks and bank holding companies. The Shulman court
disregarded the legislative intent behind the statute and refused a
remedy simply because the case involved a publicly held corporation rather than a closely held corporation as in Swerdloff.
B.

The Existence of a Substantive Violation

Case law interpreting section 1972 also addresses whether a
substantive violation of the provision exists. In addition to its discussion on standing, Swerdloff indicates the conduct that section
1972 prohibits. If the Swerdloffs could prove their substantive allegations on remand, they would likely succeed under the provision.
Costner v. Blount National Bank9 7 provides a more dramatic example
of the conduct the statute proscribes. In Costner, the plaintiff, owner
of 50% of the stock in an automobile dealership, obtained a
$420,000 personal loan from the Blount National Bank to purchase
the remainder of the company's outstanding stock.98 The bank im91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98

Id. at 59-60.
513 F. Supp. 979 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
Id. at 981.
Id.
Id. at 984 n.6.
Id.
578 F.2d 1192 (6th Cir. 1978).
Id. at 1194.
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posed several conditions in its credit agreement with Costner.
These conditions included requirements that the company sell a
substantial share of its retail commercial paper to the defendant
and that the company employ a person designated by the bank to
ensure compliance with the arrangement. The bank's credit arrangement clearly violated the Bank Holding Company Act. 99 Here
a bank had clearly taken unfair advantage of its economic position
to impose an unlawful conditional transaction.
Costner exemplifies the type of anticompetitive conduct which
Congress has attempted to prevent by passing section 1972. The
legislative history clearly indicates that Congress aimed section
1972 at anticompetitive tying arrangements. Significantly, however, the provision also prohibits exclusive and reciprocal dealing
arrangements. As with tying arrangements, Congress intended to
establish a blanket prohibition preventing banks and bank holding
companies from engaging in the Costner type of conditional
transactions.
C.

Exceptions to Section 1972

Other cases interpreting section 1972 have addressed the provisional "traditional bank practice exemptions." 10 0 Section 1972
contains three exceptions. First, a bank may impose a tying arrangement involving a "loan, discount, deposit, or trust service"
(the traditional banking services).' 0 ' Second, a bank may impose a
conditional transaction where the bank requires the customer to
provide some additional credit, property, or service "related to and
usually provided in connection with a loan, discount, deposit, or
trust service."' 0 2 Third, a bank may place reasonable restrictions
on a borrower to protect the soundness of the credit extended by
03
the bank.1
Courts are reluctant to find section 1972 violations if the financial institution's actions are designed only to protect the institution's investment or loan. In Sterling Coal Co. v. United American
Bank, 0 4 for example, a federal district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment where the defendant bank had
conditioned the extension of credit upon the bank supervising and
controlling the plaintiff's checking account and other corporate affairs. This condition included a veto power over purchases and the
99
100
NEws,
101
102
103
104

Id.
See S. REP. No. 1084, supra note 6, at 18, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.

at 5536.
12 U.S.C. § 1972(1)(A)
12 U.S.C. § 1972(I)(C)
12 U.S.C. § 1972(1)(E)
470 F. Supp. 964 (E.D.

(1982).
(1982).
(1982).
Tenn. 1979).
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payment of dividends. The court stated that "the Act does not prohibit attempts by banks to protect their investments."1 0 5 The court
further indicated that it "would be surprised indeed if a bank were
to loan large sums to a new, closely held corporation without obtaining control over its disbursements and without requiring a corporate guarantee of the indebtedness of its sole stockholders." 10 6
Accordingly, requirements designed only to protect the bank's loan
are permissible under section 1972.
As Sterling Coal illustrates, the courts are tolerant of conditional
transactions ostensibly imposed by banks to protect their credit extensions. In Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Alabama Bank of Montgomery,
° a
N.A., 107
jury found that the defendant bank conditioned a loan to
the plaintiff on two elements: first, the appointment of a local businessman to manage the plaintiff corporation, and second, the
granting of an option to the businessman to purchase a controlling
interest in the company in lieu of compensation. Nevertheless, the
district court granted the defendant a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed.108
The court of appeals looked to the legislative history of section
1972 and found that Congress "did not intend to prohibit attempts
by banks to protect their investments where no anticompetitive
practices were involved." 10 9 Due to financial difficulties, Parsons
Steel anticipated an inability to repay its debts. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit decided that, given the specific purposes for the enactment of section 1972, it was not sufficient to
show simply that a particular method of protecting against default
is not commonly used to establish a violation of the statute.' 10 The
court held that unless the "unusual" banking practice is an anticompetitive tying arrangement which benefits the bank, it does
not fall within the scope of the Act's probitions."'
105 Id. at 965.
106 Id.
107 679 F.2d 242 (1lth Cir. 1982).
108 Id. at 246.
109 Id. at 245.
110 Id.
111 Id. In other cases, courts have found that unusual banking practices designed to
protect bank loans do not violate § 1972 merely because they resemble tying arrangements.
In B.C. Recreational Indus. v. First Nat'l Bank, 639 F.2d 828 (1st Cir. 1981), the Court held
that the defendant's requirement that the plaintiff hire a financial advisor in order to obtain
credit did not violate § 1972. The court stated, "in addition to there being no tie-in alleged
or proved, in any event, the arrangement complained of falls within the range of appropriate traditonal banking practices permissible under the Act." Id. at 832. In Tose v. First Pa.
Bank, 648 F.2d 879, 897 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 893 (1981), the defendant conceded
that it demanded that Leonard Tose, owner of the Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, relinquish financial control of his professional football team as a condition to continuing a loan.
The court held "as a matter of law that this was not a demand for a 'service. . . other than
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From a policy perspective, the traditional bank practice exemptions make sense. Banks generally have a duty to look after their
depositors' interests. To protect those interests, a bank, for example, may condition a loan upon the borrower hiring an accounting
firm to audit the borrower's business. Banks need such flexibility to
protect their investments. Not only does this flexibility allow banks
to better protect their loans, it may also indirectly promote competition in the economy. If banks have this flexibility, they may loan
money to customers to whom they would not otherwise extend
credit. These customers may need credit to stay in business. Legislation should not be interpreted as discouraging banks from employing imaginative means to protect loans that they would not
otherwise make for fear of section 1972 liability.
III.

Conclusion

In passing section 1972, Congress intended to crack down on
the perceived ability of banks and bank holding companies to take
unfair advantage of their economic power. Congress intended section 1972 as a stiff remedy, creating a private cause of action with
potential treble damage awards against violators of the provision.
At the same time, however, Congress did not intend to interfere
with traditional banking practices. Both the statute itself and the
legislative history support this conclusion. In general, the decisions
interpreting section 1972 comport with congressional intent.
If a bank has a legitimate business interest to protect, it should
prevail in a section 1972 case despite the anticompetitive effect of
its conduct. To determine this, courts must examine the particular
circumstances of each case. If a defendant bank's conduct is anticompetitive and unwarranted by any legitimate banking interest,
the court should allow the plaintiff to prevail. Furthermore, Congress designed section 1972 to permit private plaintiffs to attack
conditional transactions with greater ease than under the general
antitrust laws. Accordingly, a section 1972 plaintiff should establish
a prima facie case by merely showing the imposition of a condithose related to and usually provided in connection with a loan.' " Id. The court continued, stating that the "imposition of financial controls over the Eagles was directly related to
maintaining the security of FPB's [First Pennsylvania Bank] substantial investment, and the
bank's demand cannot be considered unusual in the face of substantial evidence that it had
good reasons to be concerned about the loan." Id.
See also Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust and Savings Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assoc., 595 F.
Supp. 800, 803 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant
where defendant bank required plaintiff to engage an accounting firm to audit plaintiff as a
condition to restructuring a loan agreement); Continental Bank of Pa. v. Barclay Riding
Academy, Inc., 93 N.J. 153,459 A.2d 1163 (1983) (use of a mortgage to secure a previously
unsecured loan does not violate § 1972).
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tional transaction which is not justified by a legitimate banking interest.
Joseph C. Chapelle

